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Abstract 
When a planner must decide whether it has 
enough evidence to make a decision based 
on probability, it faces the sample size prob­
lem. Current planners using probabilities 
need not deal with this problem because they 
do not generate their probabilities from ob­
servations. This paper presents an event­
based language in which the planner's proba­
bilities are calculated from the binomial ran­
dom variable generated by the observed ratio 
of one type of event to another. Such prob­
abilities are subject to error, so the planner 
must introspect about their validity. Infer­
ences about the probability of these events 
can be made using statistics. Inferences 
about the validity of the approximations can 
be made using interval estimation. Interval 
estimation allows the planner to avoid mak­
ing choices that are only weakly supported 
by the planner's evidence. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Planning relies on choosing the future actions most 
likely to be effective. Because actions are taken after 
they are planned, a planner's information is uncertain 
at planning time. Probabilities have been explored 
as a means of representing and reasoning about this 
uncertainty. In some domains, the necessary probabil­
ities can be gathered by querying experts in the field. 
If such experts do not exist, an agent must be able 
to infer probabilities from observations. This paper 
develops a language that combines Allen's temporal 
interval reasoning [Allen, 1984) with statistical infer­
ence [Bickel and Doksum, 1977) to facilitate planning 
using inferences about probabilities. 
If a planner must calculate its probabilities, it must 
decide when it has enough information to be confident 
of its calculations. Deciding when one is sufficiently 
confident of probabilities generated from observations 
is called the sample size problem. The sample size 
problem will be ubiquitous for planners that calculate 
probabilities from their experience. The most imme­
diate incarnation of this problem is that of deciding 
whether choices are warranted by the evidence. A 
planner should make its decisions based on the proba­
bilities about which it has good evidence, and discount 
the probabilities about which it is uncertain. One ap­
plication of making decisions based on strength of evi­
dence as well as probability is dealing with facts one is 
told. A planner may be told that a particular course of 
actions is better than another, but if its evidence is suf­
ficiently strong, it may choose to ignore this informa­
tion. The sample size problem also arises when reason­
ing about specifying actions to an intelligent reactive 
execution module [Martin and Allen, 1990b). Here, the 
planner specifies details of its plans only if it is confi­
dent of the probabilities it has calculated. Yet another 
place the problem arises is in probabilistic solutions to 
the qualification problem [Martin and Allen, 1990a, 
Weber, 1989). The planner adds as many qualifica­
tions as it can without making the event about which 
it is reasoning so specific that there are insufficient 
statistics to make necessary choices. 
Feldman and Sproull [1977) deal with uncertainty by 
applying decision theory [Raiffa, 1970) to the problem 
of choosing appropriate actions guiding an A* algo­
rithm. Horvitz [1988) uses decision theory to reason 
about partial results in planning. Johnson and Schu­
bert [1982) use decision theory to control the cost of 
planning. More recently, Hartman [1990) has studied 
the same problem from a more formal perspective. All 
of these assume that probabilities are known before­
hand. Moreover, none of these proposals includes an 
explicit representation of time. 
Kanazawa and Dean [1989) propose a system that uses 
Bayes nets to make the computation of expected util­
ities sufficiently efficient to be used in a reactive exe­
cution architecture. They suggest using maximum en­
tropy prior distributions as uninformative J?riors [Dean 
and Kanazawa, 1988). Following Jaynes l1979), they 
choose the distribution that assumes one will receive 
the minimum amount of information from guessing. 
Kanazawa [1991] has recently coupled this Bayes net 
representation with a system for reasoning about prob­
abilities and time. 
Hanks [1988, 1990b, 1990a] has developed techniques 
for combining reasoning about time and probabili­
ties. He is concerned with predicting future events 
given uncertain observations and actions. The planner 
then chooses the most effective actions given its beliefs 
about the state of the world in the future. Hanks also 
mentions maximum entropy as a guide to appropriate 
prior distributions. 
Haddawy [1990, 1991] develops a formal logic of time 
and probability in which probability is represented by 
a modal operator over a temporal language. His sys­
tem uses objective probabilities, a theory in which his­
tory determines chance in a fixed way. The theory 
of objective probabilities is a theory of causality that 
makes Bayesian inference valid. 
Kanazawa and Hanks both choose a particular distri­
butwn from those warranted by theu system's expe 
rience. The system maintains no information about 
the amount of evidence on which this distribution is 
based, so it cannot determine that, even though the 
probability of one prediction is higher than another, 
such a prediction rests on shaky foundations. Had­
dawy assumes an ontology in which probabilities are 
defined to be determined by the past. If it is used by a 
planning system, this ontology will rule out the possi­
bility that its knowledge of the probabilities could be 
erroneous. 
This paper explores interval estimation, a standard 
technique from statistical analysis, to deal with the 
sample size problem. It develops an event-based first­
order language using temporal intervals and confidence 
intervals for reasoning about plans. Observations of 
instances of events are used to calculate confidence in­
tervals with which the system represents and reasons 
about uncertainty. The language developed is similar 
to the event logic developed by Allen [1991] which is, 
in turn, based on the temporal logic described in Allen 
and Koomen [1983] and Allen [1984]. The confidence 
intervals are used in a manner similar to Kyburg's in­
terval probabilities [Kyburg, 1983]. We provide an 
example of a planner making decisions based on the 
amount of evidence it has. 
The proposal does not address the problem of gener­
ating beliefs from sensor input. It assumes that the 
beliefs have already been formed from the input, and 
the planner must decide what probability it should 
place on projections of its beliefs. We assume that the 
planner is buffered from the necessity of analyzing raw 
sensory information and generating control signals by 
an intelligent reactive system. The planner's task is to 
monitor the progress of the reactive system and give 
suggestions based on its observations. 
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Kaelbling [1990] investigates the possibility of apply­
ing interval estimation techniques to learning in em­
bedded systems. She concludes that though learn­
ing algorithms that use interval estimation are slightly 
better than those that use point estimation, they are 
ill suited to learning in embedded systems because of 
their computational complexity and the difficulty of 
applying statistics to situations different from those in 
which they were gathered. Our use of interval estima­
tion differs from Kaelbling's in that we apply the tech­
nique to a strategic planner that is buffered from its 
situation by its reactive execution module. Moreover, 
by reasoning about the best description of its current 
situation, the planner can apply statistics to situations 
different from those in which they were gathered. 
Example As a running example, consider a robot en­
gineer trying to couple two cars. This engineer has a 
program, Old, which it executes whenever it wants to 
couple cars. It has executed the program 1000 times, 
but has coupled successfully only 500 times. Recently, 
a new program, New was written and added to the 
engmeer s repertmre. I he old program remains an ac­
tion the engineer can choose. Should the robot try the 
new program? A conservative guess of the probability 
of successfully coupling the cars using the new program 
might be 0.5, so the engineer might try it. If the engi­
neer tries once and fails, it will believe the probability 
of coupling the cars using the new program is lower 
than the probability of success using the old program. 
The engineer could be less conservative and choose a 
higher prior for the new program, but what should 
that prior be? In general, how many times should the 
robot try the new program before concluding that the 
old program is better? D 
2 KNOWLEDGE 
REPRESENTATION 
This paper develops a first-order language that allows 
one to use statistics to reason about plans and ac­
tions. The language is concerned with five kinds of 
things: actions (a), event instances (e;), temporal in­
tervals (t;), probability intervals (i;), and a-levels (a;). 
This language is similar to the language developed by 
Allen [1991]. It differs in the inclusion of probability 
intervals and a-levels. 
An event type is a set of event instances characterized 
by a sentence that constrains the temporal interval 
during which the instances of the event type occur. For 
simplicity, events in this paper are characterized only 
by their temporal properties. Therefore, a particular 
event instance can be specified by fixing the time at 
which the event occurs, Time(e). We use the term 
event to represent an event type; event instances will 
be referred to as such. The characterization of an event 
is a sentence. \Ve say that one event, e1, subsumes 
another, ez, if the characterization of e2 is a logical 
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consequence of the characterization of e1. 
Events express context and provide the basis for the 
calculation of the confidence intervals. Events encode 
the context of an action in its characterization. For 
example, being in the same city might characterize an 
event caused by any execution of the Old program. A 
particular event may also have other properties such 
as clear weather, but as long as the characterizing sen­
tence is true, the event is said to hold. Probability is 
defined as the frequency of one event relative to an­
other both in the past and in the future. For example, 
the probability that the engineer successfully couples 
two cars is the ratio of the number of successful at­
tempts to the total number of attempts. Statistics 
about events change as the planner discovers more of 
the elements that make up the probability, but the 
probability itself does not change. 
The temporal intervals associated with events allow 
the system to choose actions relative to an event, then 
order the events, allowing non-linear planning. Plans 
are generated as described by Allen [1991]. Tempo­
ral relations are specified using Allen's interval tem­
poral logic [Allen, 1984]. These temporal intervals al­
low agents to reason about sequential and concurrent 
actions. For example, the robot engineer may need to 
reason that it must keep the coupler open while back­
ing up if it wants to couple two cars. 
Actions are the names of programs. When a program 
is executed, it causes an instance of an event. For 
example, a planner's program for coupling cars may 
simply back the engine until it hits a car. Clearly, if 
the train is on the wrong track, executing this pro­
gram will not have the desired effect. The predicate 
Causes (execute( a, t), e) indicates that the program a 
was executed during time interval t and caused event 
e. Some of the circumstances that affect the results of 
executing a program may be specified in the charac­
terization of the event caused by the execution of that 
program; others may not. The circumstances that are 
specified in the characterization of such an event ex­
press preconditions of the event; those that are not 
make the events amenable to analysis by probabilities. 
That is, each event describes a set of event instances, 
each of which is different (at the very least in its time 
of occurrence). Ratios of the cardinalities of these sets 
are the probability of one event relative to another. 
Statistics are maintained on the number of occurrences 
of an event, occurrences( event-type). The reactive ex­
ecutor updates the planner's knowledge periodically. 
Each time a new temporal interval is added to the 
planner's knowledge base, it forward chains on this 
new information. If, in the process of forward chain­
ing, it proves that an instance of event e has occurred, 
it increments the value of occurrences( event-type). As 
described here, the function occurrences is not part of 
the language; instead, it is used to define the confi­
dence intervals that are part of the language. 
Example A single constraint characterizes an event 
such that an instance of it occurs whenever the agent 
attempts the Old action, 
'v'(e) [Causes (execute( Old, Time( e)), e)=>Old-Try (e)]. 
This event represents all time intervals that match its 
characterization. A Couple event is characterized by, 
'v' (cl, c2, t1, t2, e) [-,Coupled (cl, c2, t1) 1\ 
Coupled ( cl, c2, t2) 1\ 
Starts (11, Time(e)) 1\ 
Ends (t2, Time(e)) 
=> Couple (cl, c2, e)]. 
That is, a couple event is one where before the event 
the cars were not coupled, and after the event the cars 
were coupled. We name the events characterized m 
this way by the characteristic predicate. That is 
V(e) [Couple (cl, c2, e) � e E Couple(cl, c2)] 
is always true. 
If we assume the planner has seen 1000 Old-Try event 
instances, of which 500 are also Couple( cl, c2) event 
instances, i.e. 
occurrences( Old-Try) = 1000 
occurrences( Couple( cl, c2) n Old-Try) = 500 
then we have characterize the situation of the robot 
engineer at the beginning of the example mentioned 
above. The event described by Couple( cl, c2) n 
Old-Try is the least constrained one that subsumes 
both Couple( c1, c2) and Old-Try. 
When the robot is given the new program for coupling 
cars, it will need to be able to distinguish the event in 
which it tries this program. This event will be called 
New-Try, 
0 
'v' (e) [Causes (execute(New, Time(e)), e) 
=> New-Try (e)]. 
The a-levels are the probability that the parameter 
being estimated falls outside the confidence interval 
computed. Confidence intervals are calculated to be 
of the sizes of the system's a-levels. An a-level confi­
dence interval for a parameter p is a random interval 
for which the probability that the interval contains p is 
a. Confidence intervals represent the strongest possi­
ble constraints on the location of the parameter given 
the data observed. 
3 INFERENCE 
Using statistics on events, the planner can compute 
constraints on the probability distributions consistent 
with its knowledge. We define PCA1_.,( e9, ea) to be 
the 1-a% confidence interval for the mean of the bino­
mial random variable calculated from the occurrences 
of two events, e9 and ea. We call the event in which 
the action is tried the reference event, the event after 
which the goal holds the success event. 
Such a confidence interval can be approximated us­
ing the DeMoivre-Laplace theorem on the approxima­
tion of binomial distributions by normal distributions. 
Given that z.,;2 is the portion of the standard normal 
distribution such that 
P[Z > -Zaj2] = P[Z < Zaj2] = a/2 
the confidence interval for n Bernoulli trials with y 
successes is approximated by: 
To use these confidence intervals one must assume that 
the normal distribution is a good approximation to the 
binomial. This will be the case when the smaller of np, 
n( 1- p) is less than five, where p is the parameter for 
the binomial distribution being approximated. 
Where there are only a few instances of an event, ex­
act bounds can be computed. The cost of computing 
these bounds is high, but they can be precomputed 
and stored in a relatively small table for those cases in 
which the normal approximation is invalid. The exact 
a-level confidence interval for the parameter of a bino­
mial random variable generated by n Bernoulli trials 
with y successes (y > 0) will be (p1, Pu], where PI is the 
unique solution to the equation, 
and Pu is the unique solution to the equation, 
y ( ) 
n i n-i 
I: i Pu (1- Pu) =a. 
z:::::O 
Tables of confidence intervals for binomial random 
variables can be found in [Clopper and Pearson, 1934] 
and [Fisher and Yates, 1963]. There is a discussion 
of the trade-off between the exact confidence interval 
and the approximation in [Kendall and Stuart, 1961]. 
To calculate confidence intervals, the planner needs to 
know the number of occurrences, n, of instances of the 
reference event and the number of occurrences, y, of 
instances of the event subsumed by the reference event 
that are also subsumed by the success event. That is, 
the planner will need to known= occurrences( e. ) and 
y = occurrences( ea n e9) . 
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Confidence intervals are represented in the language by 
constants allowing sentences about the systems con­
straints on probabilities. One interval is "-<" another 
if the upper bound of the first is less than the lower 
bound of the second. The intervals are equal if both 
bounds correspond. Intervals that overlap are said to 
be incomparable. That is, [0.5, 0.6] -< [0.7, 0.9] but 
�([0.5, 0.6] -< [0.5, 0.9]) and �([0.5, 0.9] -< [0.5, 0.6]). 
The planner chooses the action whose confidence in­
terval at a given a-level was the highest among all 
applicable actions using -<. 
A predicate describing the planner's preferred action, 
Best (a, e9, a), can be defined using this language. The 
planner prefers an action a if and only if the statistics 
it has about the event in which the action occurred give 
clear indication that a is most likely to cause an event 
that leads to the goal (i.e., Goal(e)). The predicate 
can be defined by the following conditional: 
(1) \f(e9, e. , a , a) [Goal (e9)A 
Causes (execute( a, Time(ea)), ea)A 
\f(eb, b) [a =F bA 
Causes ( execute(b, Time(eb)), eb)A 
PCAI-a(e9, eb)-< PCAI-a(e9, ea)] 
=}Best (a, e9, a)] 
This predicate says that action a is best if and only if 
the planner's knowledge constrains the probability of 
its success to be higher than any other action. 
Example Suppose the number of occurrences of New­
Try and Couple(cl,c2) are as follows: 
occurrences( New-Try) = 2 
occurrences(New-Try n Couple(cl, c2)) = 1. 
In this example the engineer uses only a .05 a-level to 
generate its probability constraints. From the number 
of occurrences of the preceding events, the following 
constraints on the probability of the successful execu­
tion of the actions can be generated: 
PCA g5( Couple( cl, c2), Old-Try) = (0.4691, 0.5309] 
PCA95( Couple( cl, c2), New-Try) = (0.0254, 0.9747]. 
The planner knows that if these intervals1 do not over­
lap it can choose the higher interval, and with prob­
ability at least 1 - a, this decision is correct. This 
information is encoded in (1). Here, the planner can 
prove neither 
Best (Couple( cl, c2), Try-Old, .05, Old) 
nor 
Best (Couple( cl, c2), New-Try, .05, New) 
using (1). It must give up. D 
1 The confidence interval for New is exact. 
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When intervals overlap, the statistics do not indicate 
a clear choice at the a = .05 confidence level. When 
the statistics do not provide clear guidance, the robot 
might fall back on heuristics. One source of these 
heuristics might be suggestions by the programmer 
writing the programs about which the pbnncr reasons. 
Example The programmer might tell the robot that 
the new couple program is better than the old one, 
since, presumably, this was the reason for writing it. 
The planner should take this advice only if it does not 
conflict with its experience. It might therefore trans­
late this advice into a rule saying it should choose the 
new program only as long as there is no clear evidence 
that this program is inferior to the old one. Such a 
rule can be defined by the following conditional: 
(2) lf(e) [ �(PCAg5(Couple(c1, c2), Old-Try)-< 
PCA95( Couple( cl, c2), New-Try))A 
�( PCA 95( Couple( c1, c2), New-Try) -< 
PCA 95( Couple( cl, c2), Old-Try))=;. 
Best (Coupled, e, .05 New) ]. 
This sentence states that whenever there 1s insuffi­
cient information to choose between the alternatives 
it should choose the New program. Using it, planner 
can prove Best (Couple( cl, c2), e, .05, New). D 
When the planner has clear evidence that one action 
is better than another, it need not rely on heuristics. 
This will be the case when evidence about the effec­
tiveness of the New action overwhelms evidence about 
the effectiveness of the Old action. More importantly, 
the planner will cease to use the New action if it gets 
clear information that this action does not result in 
improved performance. 
Example Suppose, after applying the default rule 
100 times, the robot finds that New has resulted in 
cars being coupled 70 times. The number of times 
instances of the New-Try event and the Couple(c1,c2) 
event have occurred are 
occurrences( New-Try)= 100 
occurrences( Couple( c1, c2)) = 70, 
generating new constraints on probability, 
PCA9s( Couple( cl, c2), New-Try) = [0.6041, 0.7811]. 
Because [0.4691, 0.5309] -< [0.6041, 0.7811], the robot 
chooses the New program and will continue to do 
so unless it discovers that the probability constraints 
for the New program fall below the probability con­
straints for the Old program. 
If after the initial two executions of the New program, 
the next seven cause Couple{cl, c2} events, the robot 
stops relying on the heuristic and begins relying on 
its own experience. The exact confidence intervals for 
eight successes in nine trials is [0.5709, 0.9944] whereas 
the exact confidence interval for seven successes in 
eight trials is [0.5294, 0.9937]. Therefore, seven imme­
diate successes (i.e. the robot has seen eight successes 
in all) are sufficient to make the robot choose the New 
program without using the heuristic. 
Suppose, alternatively, that the robot discovers that it 
has successfully coupled cars only 30 times after ap­
plying the default rule 100 times. Now the number 
of occurrences of the event in which it tried the New 
program and the event in which the cars were coupled 
are 
occurrences( New-Try) = 100 
occurrences( Couple( cl, c2)) = 30 
generating new constraints on probability, 
PCA 95( Couple( cl, c2), New-Try ) = [0.2189, 0.3959]. 
The planner chooses to return the Old program be­
cause [0.2189, 0.3959]-< [0.4691, 0.5309]. 
If after the initial two observations of the Try-New 
event, the next eight event instances are not also in­
stances of the Couple{cl,c2) event the robot rejects 
the heuristic preference for the New program. Be­
cause [0.0057, 0.4292] is the exact confidence intervals 
for one success in nine trials and [0.0064, 0.4707] is the 
interval for one success in eight trials, the robot will 
need at least eight immediate failures to choose the 
Old action against the advice of the programmer. D 
The robot makes a choice when it has enough informa­
tion to do so; it may reason further or rely on heuristics 
when it cannot. As the robot gathers more informa­
tion, it can make more choices based on its information 
about the probability of success of actions and rely less 
on guesses. 
4 PLANNING 
Besides choosing actions, a planner must deal with 
preconditions and composite actions. Preconditions 
are important because some details may dramatically 
affect the probability of success of the action chosen. 
The planner must be able to take these details into 
account. The planner cannot take into account every­
thing it knows about the current situation because, 
in part, there will be only one occurrence of such an 
event. This is the sample size problem. To solve the 
problem, the planner chooses the most constrained 
event that subsumes the current situation for which 
it has sufficient statistics to make a choice. We call 
this event the initial event. 
To facilitate these solutions, a new event, ep, which 
represents the context of the action, is added to the 
computation of the probability of the goal given the ac­
tion. The planner computes PCA1-a( e9, ea, ep) from 
n = occurrences( ea n ep) and y = occurrences( ea n 
e9 n ep)· The planner chooses the preconditions that 
produce the highest comparable confidence interval. 
Exam pie The engineer is more likely to successfully 
couple cars if the cars and the engine are in the same 
city. These constraints can be added to the event 
against which the success of the action is to be mea­
sured. For example, suppose we have a new event 
called a Pre-Try in which the cars and the engine are 
in the same city. This event will be characterized by: 
'</ (e, cl, c2, city) (In (cJ, city, Time( e)) A 
In ( c2, city, Time( e)) 1\ 
In (Me, city, Time( e)) 
=? Pre-Try(e) ]. 
Another event, Any, describes a situation with no con­
straints in its characterization. 
'<l(e)[Any(e)] 
Since every event that subsumes Old-Try n Any also 
subsumes Old-Try n Pre-Try, the planner will have 
more evidence for Old-TrynAny. Since, however, suc­
cess is unlikely for Old-Tries that were not also sub­
sumed by Pre-Try, the probability of success will be 
higher for Old-Try n Pre-Try. 
To choose the appropriate preconditions, the planner 
will also need to know that both Old and New are 
programs whose intention is to couple cars. This can 
be indicated by generating a new event that is sub­
sumed by either Try-Old or Try-New, i.e., 
'</(e) (Old-Try (e) V New-Try (e)=?Try (e)]. 
Suppose that the statistics mentioned above have no 
particular context and that there are 800 instances of 
an event that subsumes Try n Pre-Try. Suppose also 
that the number of occurrences of the success event 
described above is the same as the number of occur­
rences of success for Try n Pre-Try. That is, 
occurrences( Try n Pre-Try) == 800 
occurrences( Couple( c1, c2) n Try n Pre-Try) == 501 
occurrences(Tryn Any)= 1002 
occurrences( Couple( c1, c2) n Try n Any) = 501. 
These statistics lead to the following probability con­
straints: 
PCA.g5( Couple( cl, c2), Try, Pre-Try) = 
(0.5909, 0.6579] 
PCAg5(Couple(c1, c2), Try, Any)== 
(0.4691, 0.5309]. 
Since (0.4691, 0.5309] --< (0.5922, 0.6591], the planner 
chooses Pre-Try as the preconditions to the action. 0 
The planner ignores preconditions about which it has 
insufficient information. Even though they may affect 
the probability of the goal, they can be ignored with 
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relative safety because they occur infrequently. Choos­
ing preconditions in this manner is similar to assuming 
preconditions as suggested by Allen [1991]. 
Example Suppose the engineer can recognize when 
the cars loaded or empty. 
'</ (e, cl, c2, city) (Loaded (c1, Time( e)) A 
Empty ( c2, Time( e)) A 
In ( c1, city, Time( e) ) A 
In ( c2, city, Time( e)) A 
In (Me, city, Time( e)) 
=? Pre-Try2 (e)] 
The ability to recognize the state of the cars may be 
important if the engineer's task is to move cargo. Due 
to the large number of such events, however, the engi­
neer may have weak statistics on them. 
Suppose that there are 100 instances of an event that 
subsumes Tryn Pre-Try2. Suppose also that 75 of the 
instances of the success events described above are are 
instances of Try n Pre-Try2. That is, 
occurrences( Try n Pre-Try2) == 100 
occurrences( Couple( cl, c2) n Try n Pre-Try) = 75 
These statistics lead to the following probability con­
straints: 
PCA.gs( Couple( c1, c2), Try, Pre-Try2) == 
[0.6570, 0.8245]. 
Since neither (0.6570, 0.8245] --< (0.5922, 0.6591] nor 
(0.5922, 0.6591]--< (0.6570, 0.8245], the planner chooses 
Pre-Try as the preconditions to the action again. In 
this case it chooses to ignore a precondition because it 
does not have enough information about success rela­
tive to the precondition. As far as the planner can tell 
from the statistics, success assuming one event is the 
same as success assuming the other. 0 
Once the planner has chosen the appropriate precondi­
tions for its actions, it chooses actions relative to these 
preconditions as outlined above. 
The planner must also deal with sequences of actions. 
Due to space restrictions, there is only room for a 
cursory overview of the details of generating such se­
quences. 
When choosing an action in a sequence, the plan­
ner chooses relative to a hypothetical event caused 
by executing the actions chosen earlier. For exam­
ple, in choosing the second action of a two-action plan 
(A1, A2), it should select the second action in the con­
text of the event caused by the execution of A1 in the 
initial event. Since action A1 may have many possi­
ble effects, this new event may be no simpler than was 
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the complete description of the current situation. The 
planner simplifies this event by reasoning relative to 
an event for which it has sufficient statistics to choose 
an appropriate action for the second step of the plan 
and which subsumes the event caused by executing At. 
When selecting an event from which to choose subse­
quent actions, the planner must first recognize that no 
single action is adequate. Because the effects of ac­
tions are uncertain, one possible result of any action 
is that the goal will hold. As a heuristic the planner 
might assume that no single action effectively achieves 
the goal when assuming it performs any single action 
makes the goal no more likely than assuming it does 
nothing. Here the planner can be confident that by 
using time to continue planning, it will miss deadlines. 
If the goal is part of the current situation, doing noth­
ing is most likely to cause an event in which the goal 
holds than doing nothing, as it causes an event that 
subsumes the maximum number of events and is there­
fore most likely to subsume the current situation. 
Once it has realized that it must generate a series of 
sub-goals to achieve its main goal, it can then deal with 
each sub-goal as a separate problem. The problems are 
not really separate, however, because choosing actions 
that achieve remaining sub-goals may reduce the prob­
ability that actions already chosen achieve their sub­
goals. The planner avoids such interaction by choosing 
remaining actions relative to a hypothetical event that 
subsumes the event caused by executing actions chosen 
earlier. The order in which the planner chooses actions 
is unimportant because the temporal logic allows both 
constraints that precede and constraints that follow 
the execution of actions. 
If the planner has sufficient statistics to reason about 
sequences of events, it will use them. That is, if it 
can actually make subsequent choices given the de­
sired results of previous choices, the planner will make 
the choices. In situations requiring planning, it is un­
likely that the planner will have good statistics for 
long sequences of actions, however. Except for those 
sequences that are chosen frequently, the statistics are 
likely to be very weak for the choices the planner must 
make in long plans. Note that it is the small sample 
size, not low probability, that makes such decisions 
untenable. The planner may have actually succeeded 
every time it chose an action in a very constrained 
event; it just has not made those choices often enough 
to be confident in them. 
If the planner has insufficient statistics to make sub­
sequent choices, it may rely on heuristics like the one 
described by formula (2). For example, a good heuris­
tic would be to wait until further information arrives. 
If a planner has a partial plan it cannot complete, it 
might simply specify that partial plan to the reactive 
execution system and hope for the best. Even if the 
partial plan is insufficient to actually achieve the goal, 
the planner may have more information when it needs 
to replan. 
If the planner has no applicable heuristics or world 
knowledge, it will assume the actions are independent. 
Such an assumption may be incorrect, but a planner 
that uses statistics will at least have evidence that the 
plans it is generating are ineffective when the statistics 
begin to reflect its current strategy's low probability 
of success. For example, if the planner cannot recog­
nize the event in which the cars and the engine are 
in the same city, it will continue to try to couple the 
cars, but will succeed only when the unrecognizable 
precondition holds. If the engine and cars are rarely 
in the same city, the probability of success for the en­
gineer's couple programs will fall, and the engineer's 
confidence in this low probability will increase. Even­
tually, the planner will become confident enough that 
the action rarely succeeds that it will stop attempting 
it. 
5 CONCLUSION 
A language for reasoning with statistics gives plan­
ners the ability to reason about the strength of their 
evidence. By reasoning about the strength of its evi­
dence, a planner can discount weak evidence as a rea­
son for preferring one action over another. As far as 
we are aware, no other formalism combines temporal 
reasoning and reasoning about evidence. Systems that 
gather information and generate plans based on that 
information will need this ability. 
A shortcoming of the proposal as presented here is 
the weakness of the statistical tests used. Generating 
confidence intervals and comparing them is wasteful 
of the planner's valuable data. We are studying other 
statistical tests that make better use of the data. An­
other problem is choosing preconditions based on es­
timations of the probability of the goal given the pre­
conditions. A better criterion is the information the 
preconditions provides for the the choice of actions. 
Measures of information may perform better than do 
constraints on probability. 
An unnecessary restriction of the presentation is its ad­
herence to the frequentist view of probabilities. All of 
the techniques presented in this paper are equally valid 
if one uses Bayesian interval estimation rather than 
confidence intervals. Indeed, even many of the more 
powerful statistical tests under study have Bayesian 
correlates. 
A shortcoming this proposal shares with others is the 
large number of events needed for general purpose 
planning. In this system, events play the part of op­
erators in STRIPS. Still, probabilities may suggest a 
solution to this problem. One could control the num­
ber of events the planner needs to consider by ensuring 
that the event occurs frequently. If such an assurance 
can be made, the planner can assume that if it has 
no stat1st1cs about a particular event, that event is 
rare. Such assurances may be possible if events are 
generated through cluster analysis. If the events are 
generated in this way, the planner may safely assume 
that only rare events will have no statistics. 
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